Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), the Good Parts Version

For all ya’ll too lazy to read Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), here is the key part that relates to the constitutionality of chasing suspects who run from a drug corner. The Freddie Gray scenario is almost exactly similar to Wardlow. (I’ve selectively bolded and also removed the citations, but you can click through for the court cases and such):

In Terry v. Ohio, we held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop….

[Officers were] converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the officers anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts. It was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee. An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.

In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. … The determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. We conclude Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.

Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida v. Royer, where we held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. And any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.

Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

It’s rare that one decision so perfectly mirrors a current case. And this makes it all the more absurd that there’s any question about the police officers’ stop of Freddie Gray.

Also, it’s worth pointing out, as I did in Cop in the Hood, that Wardlow and Terry are both great examples of how those who live in the high-crime ghettos are granted less constitutional protection than those who live in “nice” neighborhoods.

Police in a poor black neighborhood can (legally) get away with things that would never fly in a nice part of town. There is is a different constitutional standard based on geography and crime (and hence race). Of course people aren’t running from drug corners — or shooting each other so much — in neighborhoods without public drug dealing. Crime and “commonsense judgements” do matter. But at some level it’s still kind of messed up. It reminds me of Anatole France’s famous line: “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”